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31 SUMMARY 
In  the past decade, saving  in  the industrial countries  has  been  relatively  low.  The decline in  funds 
available for financing investment needed to support growth and welfare improvement has raised much 
concern. One important source of low national saving has been the dissaving in the government sector 
in various countries. Private saving has also generally been lower in the 1980's than in the preceding 
decades. The contribution of business saving to this decline has been comparatively minor, whereas the 
fall in household saving has played an important role. 
The paper  analyzes the households' decision-making processes to accumulate  wealth, discussing the role 
of  various factors in determining the observed personal saving patterns in the largest industrial countries. 
It addresses the dependence of the households' saving rate on age and retirement conditions in  the 
context of  the life cycle model and the implication of  demographic changes for the aggregate saving rate. 
The role of the return on savings is analyzed and how tax policy interferes with the saving decision. 
Finally, the impact of inflation, changes in wealth, and corporate saving is examined. In this context, the 
important role of uncertainty and liquidity constraints is pointed out. 
A  major conclusion of the  paper is that  households in  a  particular country or period  should  not be 
considered relatively impatient or less thrifty just because their observed overall saving rate is relatively 
low. Microeconomic Aspects of Saving 
1. Introduction 
The past decade has been marked by relatively low national saving in the industrial countries. The net 
national saving rate in the OECD countries declined from an average of around 14 p.c. of GNP in the 
preceding two decades to roughly 9 p.c.; in the 1980's, the corresponding figures were 13.5 p.c. and 10 
p.c. for the major seven industrial countries (Table 1  ). This relative decline in funds available for financing 
investment needed to support growth and welfare improvement has raised much concern.  On the one 
hand, the declining supply of global funds is faced with a large demand for global savings - enhanced 
recently by the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. On the other 
hand, despite higher capital mobility there is still a link, even though it may be declining, between a 
country's saving and investment performance. 
1 
One important cause of  low national saving has been the dissaving of  the government sector in various 
countries (Figure 1  ). Certainly most of the attention has been attracted by the US federal budget deficit 
which relative to GNP is lower than that of Canada and Italy but stands out in absolute terms and with 
respect to its impact on the world's capital market. This has led to the call for a reduction in budget deficits 
by many economists followed by declarations at the political level, e.g., at the latest Economic Summits 
of the G7. So far the consolidation process has been successful only in some countries. However, this 
seems more a problem of political feasibility  than a lack of  clarity about the necessary steps to be taken 
since they are, at least as far as the expenditure side is concerned, unambiguous. 
Private saving has also generally been lower in the 1980's than  in  the preceding decades with the 
exception of Canada where it has been noticeably higher. The role of business saving in  the general 
decline of private saving  and  hence national saving  has  been  relatively  minor compared  to  that of 
household saving. Not only do businesses provide a much smaller share (about one third) of net private 
saving than households, they also have increased their saving propensity in the course of the 1980's 
(despite a lower period average) as opposed to the downward movement of overall private saving until 
the late 1980's. Perhaps decisive is that households are the ultimate owners of  businesses and hence do, 
1See Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1989) for empirical evidence and Santillan (1991) fora survey 
of the general discussion. -2-
at least to a considerable extent. take into account the savings of businesses (of which they own shares) 
when deciding how much to save out of their disposable income.
2 
Thus. the other important cause of low national saving in the 1980's has been the decline in the saving 
rat€ of the household sector in  many countries, after an  increase during the 1960's and  early 1970's 
(Figures 1 and 2)
3
. In particular. the US household saving rate has attracted considerable attention since 
it has declined from an already relatively low level. However. it has been shown that the difference in the 
household saving ratios  between the US and other countries is  reduced considerably if the data are 
corrected for statistical differences.
4  The causes and possible remedies for the generally low level of 
household saving in the past decade are far less clear than those for government saving. The saving rate 
of  the household sector is the result of  the behavior of  a large number of individual household units which 
are influenced in their decision to accumulate capital by various factors.  In order to understand the level 
and  movement of a country's overall saving  rate  it is  necessary to study the saving behavior of the 
household units. 
Broadly speaking there are two main reasons why households save. The first, the long run, reason is 
the provision for the period after lifetime employment.  People save in order to be able to maintain their 
consumption after they stop working and possibly to leave behind a bequest.  The second reason for 
saving arises from  uncertainty either due to exceptionally low income or high necessary expenditures 
(precautionary saving). The common element is the maximization of  the (extended) household's expected 
life-time utility. When making their saving plans households are affected by various variables such as the 
age of household members, household wealth, and corporate saving, as well as by interest and inflation 
rates, tax and financial regulations. 
The purpose of this paper is  to  analyze the households' decision-making processes to accumulate 
wealth  and  in  particular,  how they are influenced by these variables.  Furthermore,  it will be shown, 
drawing on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, which role such variables may have played in 
determining observed saving patterns of the household sector of various countries. Section 2 addresses 
2This issue is discussed further in Section 4. 
3 1t should be noted that the saving rates are not  corrected for the inflation effect that usually entails an overestimation of  the actual 
saving of households and an underestimation of that of government and business sectors as discussed in Section 4.1. 
"  See Blades and Sturm (1982). Hayashi (1987) found that most of the difference between the US and the Japanese personal 
saving rates is a statistical illusion. Similarly, the US-German household savings gap can be reduced if statistical differences are 
taken into account (Kauffmann, 1990). -3-
the dependence of  the household's saving rate on age and on retirement conditions in the context of the 
life cycle model and the implication of demographic changes for the aggregate saving rate. The role of 
the return on savings and how tax policy interferes with the saving decision are discussed in Section 3. 
Finally, the impact of changes in wealth, corporate saving, inflation and income is analyzed in Section 4, 
as well as the role of uncertainty and liquidity constraints in this process. 
2. Saving for Old Age 
2. 1.  The life cycle hypothesis of  saving 
Saving is the household's decision to forego consumption at a particular moment in time to be able to 
consume at a future date. It is the result of the fact that households prefer a smooth consumption path, 
but are faced with an  income stream which is not smooth - be it due to the sharp drop in  income with 
retirement or to short-run fluctuations. The simple life cycle hypothesis of saving (assuming no bequest, 
no social security and no uncertainty)  is  a useful point of departure for analyzing this process with 
emphasis on the long run.
5  It starts from  a typical household's income stream of low income at the 
beginning of the employment period,  rising  thereafter to drop sharply when  retirement starts (in  the 
simplest case, income is constant over the full employment span, zero thereafter). The decision of how 
much to save or to consume in each period is furthermore affected by the household's initial wealth, rate 
of time preference
6
,  and the prevailing market interest rate.  According to the life cycle hypothesis, the 
saving pattern resulting from the household's attempt to maximize lifetime utility subject to its income 
stream is hump-shaped, rising from low levels in early years of economic life to high levels in later years 
and then falling to negative levels after retirement. 
Positive aggregate personal saving rates (which are observed in most countries) are explained in the 
simplest case of no productivity growth and constant income by positive population growth that gives 
younger households with relatively high saving rates a higher weight than older households. If  productivity 
growth is taken into account, one argument put forward has been that the combination of  positive popula-
5 SeeAndo and Modigliani (1963). The closely related Permanent Income Hypothesis introduced by Friedman (1957) has been 
used more often to study-short run fluctuations of income and consumption. For a brief discussion of the differences between the 
two models see Modigliani (1990). 
8  The rate of  time preference is generally assumed to be positive. This is, e.g., confirmed by Lawrance (1991) who derived from 
a sample of 1513 US households a rate of time preference of 13 p.c. for the sample mean, with lower values for higher income and 
educational levels, and vice versa. -4-
tion growth and income growth from one age cohort to the next explains positive aggregate household 
saving.
7 However, if intra-generation income growth is taken into account in addition to income growth 
from one generation to the next, the effect is no longer unambiguous; as the young household which takes 
this future income stream as given saves less in early years or even dissaves, the overall rate can easily 
be negative given positive population growth. Hence the additional assumption is needed that income 
profiles of a given generation are relatively flat which is not always true. 
Another possible explanation for a positive overall saving rate is that people save not only for con-
sumption at old age but also to leave a bequest.
8  In a growing economy the bequest left behind would 
be greater than that received and hence at any moment the overall saving for the bequest would be 
positive. Such a bequest term can quite easily be incorporated into the life cycle model.
9 It would at the 
same time help to explain why generally observed saving rates of retired people are, although lower than 
average, not negative as implied by the simple LCM.
1°  Furthermore, it would provide one possible but 
barely sufficient explanation for the observation that young households save in a growing economy (even 
though  less than  average)  despite an  (expected)  steep  rise  in  future  income.
11  Household surveys 
generally do not only confirm that saving rates are lower than average for old-age households and for very 
young households. They also reveal that the presence of children does tend to dampen the household's 
measured saving performance. 
12 
2.2. Population structure 
The primary usefulness of the simple life cycle model of saving, with or without bequest, is to explain 
how demographic factors affect the aggregate household saving rate. As the individual saving rates vary 
with age, the overall saving rate  depends on the population structure. If, for example, the share of the 
older population is relatively low, this should have, ceteris paribus, a positive effect on the overall personal 
saving rate. If, and this is slightly more complicated, life expectancy increases such that retirement at a 
given age leads to a longer  expected retirement period, the young household's effort to accumulate wealth 
7  See Ando et al. (1991) for an extensive discussion of this point and Shibuya (1987). 
8  Cf. Kotlikoff (1988). 
9  See, for example, Evans (1983). 
10 Another explanation for the positive saving ratio of the old is that the time of death is uncertain. Cf. Mirer (1979). 
11  Other more powerful explanations are uncertainty about future income and liquidity constraints (see Section 4) and the desire 
to maintain flexibility for future decisions (Ando et al., 1991 b). 
12  This is confirmed by Ando et al. (1991 a) based on microdata on Japanese households . -5-
is expected to increase the aggregate saving rate; once the generation with increased life expectancy 
reaches retirement age, there will be a higher share of people above a given age, and consequently a 
lower aggregate saving ratio.  Widely used indicators for the population structure are dependency ratios. 
Table 2 shows the old age dependency ratios (ratio between population aged 65 years and older and that 
from 15 to 64 years) in the G7 countries for selected years between 1960 and 1989. All countries have 
experienced considerable aging of their populations which certainly had a dampening effect on saving. 
This development is expected to continue.
13 
Regarding the period average, it is possible to broadly group the data into those with relatively high 
dependency ratios (the four European countries) and those with relatively low ratios (Japan, Canada, and 
the United States), with Italy and the United States at less extreme positions. The dependency ratios in 
the four European countries increased strongly In the period from 1960 and 1975 and stabilized thereafter 
at high levels (only Italy's ratio kept increasing by the same amount); their 1989 ratios range from 21.1 p.c. 
in  France to 23.9 p.c.  in  the United Kingdom.  On  the other hand, for the United States, Japan,  and 
Canada, the first half of the period under consideration saw stable rates and strong increases in  the 
second  half.  Particularly Japan's ratio, which started from  a relatively low level, has increased by 5 
percentage points since 1975 to 16.7 p.c. in 1989. Presently, Canada's old age dependency ratio is the 
lowest with 15.3 p.c.; the US ratio has reached 19.3 p.c. 
Hence, as far as the share of the older population is concerned, the population structure of the three 
non-European countries, especially Japan and Canada, seems to have been more conducive to higher 
saving rates than that of the European countries considered here. However, after widening prior to 1975, 
the gap has diminished since then.  That the share of the older population plays a role in  explaining 
intercountry differences has been confirmed by Feldstein (1980) and Koskela and Viren (1983) among 
others. 
A  quite different picture is  presented  by the young  age dependency ratios  (the  ratio between the 
population aged under 15 and that between 15 and 64) as shown in Table 3. They play a role because 
households with dependent children tend to save less. As a general trend all dependency ratios have 
declined considerably.  The US and Canada, and also Japan for the average of the period considered, 
have the highest dependency ratios with strong  declines by around 20 percentage points over time, 
whereas  the European  countries,  especially Germany and  Italy,  are at the  lower range with  more 
13  Shibuya (1987) found a dampening effect of aging, raising the share of the retired people, on Japan's saving rate. Using 
simulations he predicted a further decline of the Japanese household saving rate. Similarly, Auerbach et al. (1990), Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff(1991), and Cutleretal. (1990) project dedines in US aggregate saving rates during the first decades of  the 21st century. -6-
moderate declines ranging from 6 percentage points (United Kingdom) to 12 percentage points (France 
and Italy). 
It is likely that this dependency structure and its change has at least partly offset the effect of old age 
dependency and its increase over time. Furthermore, the international comparison indicates that the lower 
y'lung age dependency ratios in the European countries are conducive to higher saving ratios there; but 
the  gap has  recently  diminished,  and  for Japan  it  has  almost  disappeared.  A  confirmation  of the 
importance of  young age dependency ratios in explaining international household saving differences can, 
e.g., be found in Graham (1987). 
2. 3.  Social  security 
A very important and at the same time complicated issue in this context is the effect of a social security 
system on household saving. Social security replaces at least partially individual retirement saving.lt takes 
away a part of  of the household's income, lowering its disposable income, and transfers a regular sum to 
the retired  household, increasing its disposable income.  With population and productivity growth the 
impact on the overall  saving rate depends on how the social security system is funded.
14 
In a fully funded system where the government invests the contribution oftaxing a generation to pay that 
generation's old-age benefits at a later date, the decline in  personal saving of the younger (growing) 
generation caused by the social security tax is not fully matched by the lower dissaving (higher saving) 
of the older generation if people behave rationally. Hence with such a system we would expect a lower 
overall household saving rate than without it, but no change in the national saving rate since government 
saving should increase by the same amount. Furthermore, there would be no change in the consumption 
profile. 
With the so-called pay-as-you-go system, the social security contributions raised from  the working 
population are immediately redistributed to the older population. Its effect on aggregate saving depends 
crucially on the way people form their expectations about future benefits. If  the young anticipate the same 
benefits which they would receive under the funded system, the fall in their saving will exactly match the 
lower dissaving of the old with no change in the overall rate of household saving. When the system is 
1
"  In  an  economy without productivity and  population growth, the life cycle hypothesis would predict no overall change  of 
aggregate household saving. Saving ratios for younger households would be lower (both saving and income decline by the same 
amount, but the ratio dedines), and the older households' saving ratios would rise (even if benefits are fully spent, the dissaving 
relative to a higher income becomes smaller). -7-
introduced, aggregate consumption increases due to the positive wealth effect incurred by the old who 
benefit from toe system without having contributed. 
If, however, the young generation expects to gain from the social security system, anticipating the same 
relative benefits to lifetime income which the old generation currently receives, 
15 
then it would-according to the life cycle hypothesis- reduce its saving by more than the amount deducted 
by social secunty taxes from its income. Hence, with a given retirement age, the introduction or  expansion 
of the pay-as-you-go system would be expected to lower the aggregate household saving in a growing 
economy.  This decline in  aggregate household  saving  would  not be compensated  by  a  change  in 
government saving, and the proportion of income devoted to consumption would increase permanently 
through the increase in  lifetime wealth.
16  On  the other hand, if households fully understand that this 
intergenerat1ona1 redistribution will ultimately have to be financed and lead to higher taxes and if they 
altruistically take future generations' wellbeing into account as assumed for the Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem, then neither the young nor the old may perceive a positive wealth effect. Instead, they will be 
induced to leave larger bequests such that aggregate saving remains unchanged.
17 
It on the other hand.  the young generation perceives that it will not benefit from the social security 
system the way the currently old are benefiting since there will only be a relatively small number of people 
working to support an  increasing  number of old,  they may start saving  more than  under a funded 
system.
18  In this context Tabellini (1991) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991) have argued that a growing 
:~hare of the old wm  be able to influence through the democratic process the level of benefits they will 
rece1ve,  However,  as  national  economies  become  more  and  more  Interwoven  and  multinational 
corporations play a larger role,  mobility is  also likely to increase. It can therefore be argued that the 
generation who would then be forced to pay the extremely high taxes might decide to emigrate. Under 
these considerations it would not be optimal for the social security receivers who compete globally for the 
151.e., there is a higher benefit than under the funded system made possible by the payments of  future generations (with higher 
income). 
16  See Kotlikoff (1979) for a discussion on this subject 
17  See Barro (1974), Carroll and Summers (1987), and Wilcox (1989) whose findings of consumption increases in the US in 
response to the rise In social security benefit payments cast doubt not only on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, 
but also on that of the Ufe Cycle Hypothesis. 
18 In view  of  the aging problem, several countries have started to run surpluses (transforming the former pay-as-you-go systems 
into partly funded systems). But despite these efforts there may still be a negative wealth effect embedded in the social security 
system for  those currently young. On the other hand, there is the possibility of  a major inflow of  potential social security contributors, 
particularly from Eastern European countries and Soviet republics in the coming decade(s) which may partially compensate this 
effect. -8-
young contributors to vote for a very high level without taking into account this possible emigration effect. 
What has been omitted from the previous discussion is the effect that the social security system can 
have on retirement age.  It  is  important for the determination of the overall effect of the system  on 
household saving. The social security system may induce people to retire earlier than otherwise for two 
reasons. First, if social security benefits are not or  only partly paid to older persons that continue working, 
this is an implicit tax on labor supply that will discourage many people from working after they become 
eligible for retirement. Second, the positive wealth effect inherent in the social security system causes 
people not only to want more consumption goods but also more leisure.
19  But the expansion of the 
retirement (leisure) requires a larger saving effort during this shortened period of employment. Since this 
retirement effect works in an opposite direction to the wealth effect discussed above, the overall impact 
of the social security system on saving is unclear from a theoretical point of view. 
Social security payments have increased considerably relative to GOP since 1960 which cannot simply 
be explained by the fact that the share of the older population has increased (Table 4). This is particularly 
true for Japan, whose ratio of social security benefits to GOP, starting from a low 13.5 p.c. has doubled 
since then. Overall, with a given retirement age, the past improvement of  relative retirement benefits would 
suggest, according to the life cycle hypothesis, a dampening of the saving ratio since it can be assumed 
that households have in  the past expected a similar positive wealth effect as that observed for older 
people. However, Table 5 reveals that the improvement in social security benefits has moved in line with 
a decline in the labor force participation of the old,
20 making the overall effect difficult to determine. 
The empirical evidence has been  contradictory.
21  Numerous studies have found evidence that the 
social security system  has depressed savings in  the past (see,  e.g.,  Feldstein  (1974) for the US
22
, 
Shibuya (1987) for Japan) and Feldstein (1980) for international data). On the other hand, there has been 
a considerable number of  studies which found no such effect (e.g., Kotlik  off (  1979) who did, however, find 
that social security tax contributions in the US have reduced private savings of the younger group in his 
19  Assuming both are nonnal goods. In addition, the social security tax distorts the household's choice in favor of leisure. 
20 It probably has been partly caused by the increase in relative income of  the old, but may also have been affected by increases 
in other forms of wealth which will be discussed later. 
21  See Dean et al. (1990). 
22  In his 1982 paper Feldstein obtains broadly similar results, but does point to the limitations of using time series data to study 
this •inherently dynamic process. • -9-
sample and Koskela and Viren (  1983) who found indications that the induced retirement effect may have 
been at work). 
To summarize, a household's savings propensity varies considerably with age as the household tries 
to accumulate assets to provide for retirement and therefore saves most when income is high. Forced 
retirement saving through the social security system alters the flow of income; in particular, it raises old-
,age income. Therefore the perceived need to save personally in the pre-retirement period and to dissave 
during retirement is decreased since social security replaces part of  the deliberate saving. It is likely that 
these two effects may have been at work in the industrial countries, where the population has aged and 
the social security system has expanded. However, their impact has been counterbalanced by the decline 
in young-age dependency ratios and a decrease in retirement age. Whereas the on-going aging of the 
population structure is expected to have a dampening effect on overall household saving rates, individual 
households will probably save more for a retirement period which may bring only relatively low benefits. 
The increase in the retirement age that should have a dampening effect on savings will probably be 
compensated by an increase in life expectancy which would increase savings. 
3. The Return on Saving 
3. 1.  The real  interest rate 
A crucial element in  the household's intertemporal decision-making process is the real interest rate. It 
signals the extra consumption that can be afforded in the future per unit consumption given up at the 
present. How and in what direction the interest rate affects household saving has been a heavily debated 
issue.
23 Probably the main reason for this ongoing debate is that the answer to the question whether or 
not households respond to increases in interest rates by saving more (positive interest elasticity)  has 
major implications for the impact of  tax policies on the households' saving behavior and ultimately on the 
question whether changes in the tax policy could increase welfare. 
The problem of  determining the sign and size of  the interest elasticity of  saving arises from the fact that 
an interest rate change affects the household's saving process through different channels which, taken 
separately,  lead to opposite reactions.  An  increase in  the interest rate  makes current consumption 
relatively more expensive inducing the household to postpone consumption ("substitution effect").  In 
addition, due to the higher interest rate the household's future labor income now is worth less in present 
terms, which should increase the household's saving effort ("human wealth effect," which is one particular 
23  See, e.g., Soskin (1978), Summers (1981 ), and Evans (1983). -10-
type of income effect).
24 On the other hand, the household now receives more interest income for the 
same amount of saving, allowing it to consume more in  all future periods if it is a net creditor.
25 This 
direct "income effect" would induce higher consumption in the present as well as in all future periods, 
lowering current saving. Hence, in order for the household's overall saving reaction to an interest rate 
increase to be positive, it is necessary that the substitution and human wealth effects dominate the income 
offect. Clearly, the household's reaction to an interest rate rise depends on which stage of economic life 
the household is moving through.
26  For example, if the household had just reached retirement and was 
expecting no or only very negligible social security payments,  intuitively it can  be expected that the 
possibility of buying more in future periods due to the income effect may induce him to consume more 
today in  response to an interest rate increase. There would be no or only a very small human wealth 
effect, and the substitution effect would most likely be dominated by the income effect. On the other hand, 
in the case of a young household, the human wealth effect is more important; given the long economic 
life ahead the gain to be made from saving to broaden the range of consumption paths may seem more 
worthwile.
27 
It should be kept in mind that the discussion of  these effects is based on the assumption that the interest 
rate change observed is expected to be permanent. If  uncertainty is taken into account, it is less likely that 
a risk-averse household would be induced by an  interest rate  increase to save less on the basis of 
increased future consumption possibilities which he may in fact never reach if the interest rate declines 
again  because of the irreversibility of his  choice for more  current consumption  today.  The issue of 
uncertainty will be addressed below but it seems worth mentioning it here because it has an effect on the 
interest elasticity of saving that we expect to observe in reality. 
Real interest rates have been considerably higher in the 1980's than in the previous two decades.
28 
However, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that this observation, together with an unusually low 
24 It should also increase the incentive to work. 
25 If it is a net debtor, saving should be increased. The household sector generally is a net creditor of the business and public 
sectors. In a closed economy the aggregate income effect may be unimportant if  the households' ownership of  businesses and their 
future tax payments are fully considered in the saving decision. However, as countries generally either are net debtors or  creditors 
(see, e.g. Sinn, 1990), the income effect cannot be ignored. 
26  See also Evans on this point (1983). 
27  Summers (1981) pointed out in a footnote that the terminology of the "human wealth effect" might be somewhat misleading 
since it has this positive effect ("broadening the set of  feasible consumption paths") in addition to the effect of "reducing the value 
of consumers' endowment in terms of first-period consumption. 
28  It is problematic to calculate the real interest rate correctly since it depends on expectations about future inflation rates and 
not actual values. -II-
saving  performance of households,  does signify a negative interest elasticity.  On  the contrary,  the 
evidence is quite mixed and more often indicates that the interest elasticity of  saving is positive (cf. Smith, 
1989). But there are considerable differences with respect to the estimated size of  the interest elasticity 
of saving. While some, e.g., Boskin (1978), Summers (1981), and Tullio and Contesso (1986) find large 
positive effects, others as, e.g., Evans (1983) do not find any significant effect of  interest rate changes on 
aggregate household saving. 
3.2.  Tax~ 
Ofthe  three types of  taxation, consumption tax, wage tax, and capital income tax, only consumption tax-
if  it is linear- is completely neutral with respect to the savings rate; i.e., it does not distort the household's 
intertemporal decision. This indirect tax is raised when consumption takes place, but it does not burden 
future consumption any differently from current consumption. On the other hand, both wage and capital 
income taxes do influence the household's intertemporal saving decision. The wage tax extracts income 
only during the pre-retirement period and therefore shifts the household's saving activity backwards, 
leading to lower saving rates in earlier years. The tax on interest income drives a wedge between the 
household's  intertemporal  substitution  in  consumption  and  the  firm's  intertemporal  substitution  in 
production.
30 With positive interest elasticity, a tax on interest income induces the household to save less 
than without the tax.  The firms then have to pay higher (before tax)  interest rates in order to induce 
households to increase their saving, ultimately leading to a situation where less is saved and invested and 
consequently per capita income is lower than without the tax (or with the consumption tax).
31 
The different implications for saving and welfare of income-based as compared to expenditure-based 
taxes have been pointed out by Summers (1981), Kotlikoff (1984), Smith (1989), and many others and 
have led to a call for a move in the direction of expenditure-based taxation.
32 
29 For a more detailed discussion of this subject see Owen's contribution in this book. 
30 See Bovenberg et al. (1989); this paper also addresses the effects of different treatment of  income earned by residents and 
non-residents in the US and Japan. 
31  Apart from the direct effect of taxation on household  saving,  there is also the indirect effect via business saving.  Higher 
corporate tax rates dampen after-tax business profits and hence the dividend payments received by households. Furthermore, as 
Poterba (1987) shows, higher dividend tax rates tend to lower  the payout to households and to increase corporate saving (from which 
households ultimately benefit as well). 
32  Of  course, it is recognized that the consumption tax is more regressive than a progressive income tax and may therefore be 
rejected on equity grounds. Furthermore, it does distort the decision between leisure and consumption, taxing the latter  heavily, but 
not the former. - 12-
In considering how the households' saving process is distorted in different countries one first measure 
one might look at is the marginal income tax rate. This could lead to the conclusion that savings is much 
less discouraged in the United States and Canada, with maximum marginal tax rates around 30 p.c. than 
in most European countries, where rates range from a "low" 40 p.c. in the United Kingdom to 60 p.c. in 
Italy. However, there are reasons to believe that this does not characterize the situation correctly. If the 
ratio of  direct to indirect taxes is compared, the United States and Canada have, together with Japan and 
Italy, relatively high ratios (Table 6).
33 This ratio has been very similar in the United States and Japan 
in the eighties, with relatively high 1. 7 and 1.6, respectively, followed by Italy which has seen a continuous 
rise in direct taxes as a share of  GNP, with Canada as well as Germany, the United Kingdom, and France 
at the lower end. It is likely that the Canadian ratio will drop in response to the introduction of the value-
added tax at the beginning of 1991; similarly, the increases in consumption tax in  1990 in Japan and in 
various excise taxes in the United States may have contributed to a lower ratio.
34 
Important in this context is the interaction between taxation and inflation.  The reduction in real wealth 
caused by inflation is compensated for, as far as it is expected, by higher nominal interest rates.  Since 
these interest payments generally are counted fully as  income, the effective taxation of the amount 
actually saved is increased. First, the part that compensates only for income losses is taxed as well as 
the real return on saving. Secondly, the progressiveness of the tax system may imply a higher marginal 
and average tax rate if  the tax system is not fully indexed as is usually the case. Thus, in combination with 
a tax system, especially if it is progressive, inflation causes the effective real rate of interest to decline 
(which is usually only partially compensated for by an increase in the rate paid by the investor). These 
effects may discourage savings (in inflation-adjusted terms) in countries with relatively high inflation such 
as Italy and the United States.
35 
If we focus on the capital income tax which is the type of income tax that, given a positive interest 
elasticity of  saving, discourages saving most, the picture changes even more. Besides the official income 
tax rates,  the  issue of how tax collection  is  actually  insured  and  whether there are exemptions or 
deductions play an important role. In Germany, for instance, where this has been the subject of a recent 
ruling of the German Constitutional Court,
36  presently there is neither a source tax
37  nor reporting of 
33  Certainly it is not possible to decide on this basis alone as to whether one tax system is more distorting than another since it 
does not take into account the tax incidence as can be seen from the shares in GOP. 
34  For a list of such increases in the United States, see, e.g. the Sll Report (1991). 
35  There are other effects of inflation on saving which will be discussed later. 
36  Urteil des Zweiten Senats des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27. Juni 1991. -13-
banks to the revenue offices.
38 In most of the other countries including the other six of the G7 countries 
there are measures that ensure tax collection (Table 7). Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy have source 
taxes varying from 20 p.c. (Japan) to 30 p.c. (Italy) for deposits, whereas in the United States, Canada, 
and France, banks are obliged to report on capital income to ensure tax compliance. For dividends the 
conditions are about the same, but in this case there is also a source tax of 25 p.c. in Germany. 
Of course, it is not suggested here that the measures taken in the countries are able to prevent tax 
evasion altogether. It is well known that banking accounts in countries where capital income is neither 
taxed nor reported, e.g., Luxembourg, are quite common. So the explanatory power of  the difference in 
effective rates of  taxation and possibilities for evasion among countries should not be overestimated. But 
it is quite possible that the lack of tight control on capital income taxation in some countries such as 
Germany may have distorted less against the saving process than in other countries. 
3.3.  Tax exemptions and  saving incentives 
Governments have created a variety of  tax exemptions with the goal of  promoting domestic savings. The 
understanding that this will have the desired effect rests, of course, on the presumption that the interest 
elasticity of  saving is indeed positive. Interest income from certain government bonds are very commonly 
exempted.
39  In addition, there has been a tradition in some countries, including Japan and France to 
exempt income earned on personal saving accounts. This has been particularly important in Japan where 
about 70 p.c. of interest income earned on personal saving was exempt until the tax reform of 1988.
40 
It had the effect that the average tax rate paid on this type of income was below 10 p.c. in the 1980's 
(Bovenberg et al.,  1989). The comparable average ratios for the same years were much higher in the 
United States, ranging from 28.5 p.c. in  1980 to 22.4 p.c. in  1987. 
37 A 10 p.c. source tax was introduced in 1990 and abolished only six months later due to massive capital flight. 
38  On the contrary, the banking law of 1979 does specifically ask local tax authorities to respect the •relation of trust• between 
banks and customers. As a result of the legal situation which has to be changed by January 1, 1993 practically only those who 
declare their capital income have to pay taxes since those cases where nothing is delared are extremely unlikely to be investigated. 
According to the Court, no more than half  of the taxable capital income is declared in Germany which is based on estimates of the 
German authorities. The Bundesrechnungshof (General Accounting Office) even found during its examinations (of a very limited 
number of  households) that the quota of  declaration varied between 3. 7 p.c. and 47.7 p.c. from one revenue office to the other. In 
reaction to the ruling there is now a proposal to Introduce a 25 p.c. source tax for residents and to revise upwards substantially the 
exemption levels. 
39 Byrne's (1979) list of countries with such a custom Included all countries currently belonging to the G7. 
40 Since 1988, most income in Japanese savings accounts is subjected to a 20 p.c. source tax (cf. Hayashi et al., 1988). - 14-
Two forms of saving are often treated very generously. One is saving explicitly tied to the provision for 
retirement (private pension plans or special accounts), the other is saving for and in the form of private 
housing. Such preferential treatment may merely cause the households to shift assets into those forms 
that  benefit  from  such  measures  without  increasing  the  households'  overall  saving  propensity. 
Undoubtedly there will be such a shift. But there is also evidence that these incentives may well have a 
positive overall impact on the households' saving activity, as, e.g., in Carroll and Summers (1987) who 
examined  the  difference  in  saving  rates  between  the  United  States  and  Canada.
41  The  US  and 
Canadian saving rates were very similar until the early seventies when they started to diverge. One of  the 
factors Carroll and Summers identified as contributing to these divergences is the treatment of  retirement 
saving which became increasingly more generous in Canada, as compared to the United States, through 
various increases in  the ceilings of tax-sheltered contributions to pension plans (employer-sponsored 
Registered Pension Plans and individual Registered Retirement Savings Plans).
42 In the United States, 
there have also been sheltered saving opportunities (Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's) and Keogh 
plans),  but they were much more limited.
43  In  his FY 1992 budget proposal,  the President proposed 
enhancing IRA's again as well as creating so-called Family Savings Accounts.
44 
In the context of housing it is again not the United States that has the most generous treatment of 
saving. In some countries, e.g., Germany and France, there are bonus and deduction schemes for saving 
that is tied to housing construction or purchase, thus prior to the acquisition of  a house; in Germany, where 
various programs were started after WWII to cultivate household wealth and home ownership, they have 
been slowly cut back.
45 Once a house has been purchased, this asset generally receives preferential 
treatment relative to other forms of  wealth because neither the implicit rental income nor the capital gains 
from an increase in the value are taxed.
46 
41  This is a particularly good case for comparison since the two countries have much in common not only geographically and 
institutionally but also demographically. 
42  In addition, a $1000 deduction of investment income was introduced in 1974. 
43 For example,  the  IRA's were first restricted  to a small  number of people,  then  extended  to  all taxpayers  in  1981,  and 
subsequently capped in  1986. 
44  See Annual Report on the U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative (1991). 
45  In 1975, government bonuses were restricted to medium and low-income earners; cf. Kauffmann (1990). 
46  In addition , it is common that the real estate property is largely undervalued when an inheritance asset is estimated. -15-
Another measure that certainly does induce the shift of assets into housing is  the deductibility of 
mortgage interest  payments which  is  possible  in  all  G7  countries  except for Canada.
47  This  is  an 
especially beneficial scheme for households in those countries where tax rates and/or inflation and hence 
nominal interest rates are high. It may, however, dampen the household's overall savings propensity 
mainly in cases where it is possible to use some of the mortgage credits for consumption purchases. The 
extreme case of explicitly deducting interest payments for consumption goods which was until recently 
the practice in the United States certainly had a dampening effect on the consumer's saving propensity. 
To conclude, apart from social security, various other government policies influence the households's 
saving process. How important this impact is depends to a large extent on the interest elasticity of  saving. 
If it is, as suggested by some studies, significantly positive, then taxes discourage the households from 
saving the amount that would be optimal for the economy as a whole. Although the marginal tax rates are 
relatively low in the United States as compared to other countries, a closer examination of generous 
exemption schemes,  e.g.,  in  Japan and Canada, and  looser  enforcement of tax collection,  e.g.,  in 
Germany, indicate that the effective taxation of  capital income in the United States may have been higher 
than in other countries, particularly if the interaction between taxation and inflation is taken into account. 
It may be a coincidence that countries with relatively high saving rates such as Japan and Germany 
either have little control of  tax collection or  generous tax exemption rules. For instance, it has been argued 
that those countries which have a "tradition of saving," are those which are most likely to use saving 
incentives; this would lead to the conclusion that the observed coincidence of  generous tax treatment and 
a high saving ratio would not prove any positive effect from those measures. But the experience in the 
United States and Canada seems to indicate that tax deductions and  saving incentives can  make a 
difference. 
4. Changes in Wealth and Income 
4. 1.  lnDalion 
The impact of inflation on household saving is ambiguous since the process involves various short-run 
as well as  the long-run  channels which  have opposite effects.  One effect which  has  already  been 
mentioned  is  more of a  measurement problem  than  a  real  impact on  the households' behavior of 
47  As pointed out by Dean et al. (1990), in tenns of effiCiency it would make sense if  interest payments were tax deductible as 
long as the income on housing investment were taxed. But  as they are not it is likely that the various measures lead to a distortion 
of investment in favor of housing and at the expense of business. -16-
accumulating assets: If inflation is anticipated, the erosion of  wealth that it causes is compensated for by 
a corresponding inflation premium on the real interest rate. The household who accumulates wealth will 
consider this part of  interest payments as a necessary contribution to keeping his real wealth constant and 
will only count the remaining  part to his actual saving.
48 Measured saving, on the other hand, does 
include these  inflation-premium  payments.  Therefore  it generally (for years  with  positive inflation) 
overstates the real saving activity of the household sector which is a net creditor. It understates at the 
same time the actual saving of the business and government sectors that tend to be net debtors.
49  The 
difference between actual and measured saving is, of course, particularly high in periods and countries 
of high inflation. 
During the 1970's  when the two oil shocks drove up inflation rates (Figure 3), the measured saving rates 
overstated the actual saving activity of households markedly while understating actual business saving. 
Consequently, the actual fall in household saving during the early 1980's when inflation declined was less 
pronounced than indicated by measured saving rates. However, Dean et al. (1990) who compared the 
original to adjusted saving rates found that the inflation adjustment does not generally change the fact that 
saving was higher in the 1970's and neither does it affect the position of saving rates in the 1980's as 
compared to the 1960's. 
A  related  and  already mentioned  channel  through  which  expected  inflation  affects  saving  is  the 
interaction between the tax system and inflation. It leads to a lower effective rate of return because the 
"compensation payments" discussed above are counted as taxable income; assuming a positive interest 
elasticity of saving, the household's saving rate declines. 
As for unanticipated inflation, there are several channels that may play a role in the shorter run. When 
inflation is unexpected, compensation for the erosion of  wealth does not take place and the real return on 
wealth declines (at first). This has the various effects (substitution, human wealth, income) discussed 
above in connection with real interest rate changes. In addition, the household may be induced to shift 
from financial wealth into real assets which are now relatively more attractive. Since these real assets 
include consumer durables which are part of  the consumption measure despite the fact that they are not 
48 Von Ungem-Stemberg (1981) showed in an empirical studyforGennany and the United Kingdom that households do indeed 
behave as if they would not consider the compensation for wealth erosion through inflation as part of their income. 
49 Modigliani ( 1990) found an underestimation of  government saving (corresponding broadly to the same  overestimation of  private 
saving) in the order of  half a percentage point in the 1960's and 2 percentage points in the 1970's and 1980's for the average of  the 
21  OECD countries. See also Elmeskov et al. (1991) and Barro (1974) on this issue. -17-
fully consumed during the current period, the saving rate declines.
50 Furthermore, two opposite effects 
of money illusion are conceivable: First, if households mistakenly perceive income growth at least partly 
as real income growth (although it is not), then they may decide to increase real consumption which will 
lower their saving rate (Branson and Klevorick, 1968). Second, if households mistakenly take observed 
price increases for increases in relative prices, they may buy less consumption goods than under perfect 
information (Deaton, 1977). 
The empirical evidence on  the saving-inflation  link is  mixed.
51  When the "compensation  effect" is 
captured by a "real wealth variable", the estimated sign and significance of  the remaining effect of  inflation 
on saving varies considerably from  study to study. Whereas a negative sign is generally taken as  a 
reasonable result, those authors who find a positive sign most often attribute it to the fact that inflation is 
positively correlated with uncertainty and that higher uncertainty causes higher saving (see  discussion 
below).  In  that case  the  lower inflation of the  1980's (if it  is  separated from  the related  decline in 
uncertainty) may well have been a factor encouraging households to save more than in the previous 
decade. 
4.2. Increases in current wealth 
The life cycle and permanent income hypotheses predict that with given expected income an increase 
in current real wealth decreases the share of current disposable income saved since it renders possible 
a  higher  lifetime  consumption  level.  Conventional  income  and  saving  measures  do  not  include 
revaluations of real wealth. Therefore measured saving rates decline when households incur a positive 
wealth effect and raise current consumption accordingly. For example, an increase in the real value of 
housing, which is an important form of household wealth, may decrease the saving propensity of  those, 
mostly older, households who own a house. Clearly, the households can now afford a higher level of 
lifetime consumption despite the fact that their labor income streams are unchanged. Those households 
who neither own nor want to buy a house may save more to finance the rent payment or they may opt for 
a smaller apartment or house and maintain their saving rate. 
The impact on the savings behavior of a young household which does not yet own a house but has 
purchasing plans is less straight forward. If we assume that it expects to derive some utility from living in 
its own house, the household may increase savings in order to still be able to purchase it. This is the so-
50  The fonner effect depends on a positive elasticity of saving. 
51  Cf. Stunn (1983) and Koskela and Vireo (1985). -18-
called target saving argument. However, this argument fails to consider that the choice for  owner-occupied 
housing is price elastic, with higher prices likely to discourage the choice for housing purchase.  5
2 
Although the implication for the young households' saving behavior is not clear a priori, it is likely that 
the overall effect of the increase in  the real value of housing is  negative.
53 However, the reaction of 
savings to an increase in  housing wealth should be less pronounced than that caused by increases in 
most other sources of  wealth since it is related to higher rent payments (consumption expenditures) and 
may also not be sold as easily at the end of life as other forms of wealth.
54 
Household wealth  and  particularly  housing  wealth  increased  considerably  in  the  1980's.  Wealth 
increases were exceptionally high in Japan where housing and land prices have skyrocketted; increases 
in housing wealth were also considerable in the United Kingdom and Canada.
55 1t seems therefore likely 
that this increase in housing wealth dampened household savings, particularly in Japan, and possibly also 
in other countries. Similarly, during the 1980's, stock prices rose rapidly until1987, and especially so in 
Japan. This long-run movement certainly stimulated consumption during the 1980's. In the short run, on 
the other hand, consumption generally reacts only partially to stock price increases since they will -given 
their high variance- at first be considered mostly temporary. This is probably the reason why the stock 
market crash in 1987 did not dampen private consumption as much as was generally expected. 
4.3. Corporate saving 
The ownership of business assets is a particular form of household wealth. It gives rise to current and 
future income streams from the business to the household sector. This link between both sectors of the 
economy makes it impossible to explain corporate and household saving independently of each other. 
A part of  the relation between the two savings ratios is more of a measurent problem mentioned earlier 
than a structural link: Since the household is a net creditor of the business sector (including the financial 
52  Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) found in a study of  Japanese households that the decision not to buy property induced by an 
increase in land prices was strong enough to tum a positive (land-) price elasticity of saving into a negative one. 
53  If  there is a bequest motive, one might expect that the savings rate declines less given the expectation that children will be 
affected negatively by higher housing prices either through higher rents or  through higher purchasing prices. But it  is not likely that 
this will fully compensate for the drop in savings induced by the wealth effect. 
54 See  Thaler (1990) for a discussion of the fungibility of wealth. 
55  In Japan, the ratio of  net  wealth (including housing and land) to income rose from 5.0 in 1975 to 7.8 in 1987. The corresponding 
figures for the United States, Canada, and the United Kindom stayed roughly between 4 and 5 (Dean et al., 1990). -19-
sector), it is compensated for the erosion of  its net wealth position if inflation is positive and expected. This 
inflation premium is counted in the statistics as income and saving (if it is reinvested to keep real net 
wealth constant) and leads to an overprediction of actual household saving and an  underp1rediction of 
actual business saving. The effect is that with changing inflation  both  sectors' saving rates move in 
opposite directions. 
56 
Much more interesting is the structural relation between the two sectors' saving rates. The discussion 
has mainly centered around the question: "To what extent do households pierce through the corporate 
veil?" Shareholders receive a part of  their current income in form of dividends from the firms that are left 
with "retained after-tax profits" to invest. As these investments produce future income flows, a household 
who completely "pierces the veil" takes business saving fully into account in  its lifetime consumption 
strategy. In particular, with perfect capital markets it displays the same consumption behavior whether or 
not business profits are distributed. This can also cause corporate and household saving rates to move 
in opposite directions. With given profits, higher dividend payments would lower business saving, causing 
the household's measured income to decline. Since the household would perceive the compensating 
increase in  future income (indicated by capital gains which are not included in  the measured current 
income), its consumption should remain unchanged even though its measured saving rate would decline. 
That household and business sector saving rates move in opposite directions resulting in a relatively 
stable private saving rate was first observed by Denison  (1958)  and  since then  confirmed  by many 
others.
57  However,  some  studies  such  as  Poterba  (1987)  found  that  household  saving  offsets 
movements in the corporate saving rate only partially; this implies that tax policy affecting the  firm's payout 
decision has an impact on the private saving rate. 
Corporate saving has been relatively low in the 1970's which resulted from several factors including 
lower profit shares and higher inflation and interest rates as a result of the oil price shocks. During the 
1980's, measured corporate saving has picked up again as profit shares increased and inflation declined. 
However, the households have had more liquid financial means available for consumption during the past 
decade than the dividend payments included in  measured disposable personal income may suggest. 
Share repurchases spurred by takeover threats and tax considerations as well as leveraged buyouts (both 
affecting neither measured personal income nor saving) have played an important role.  For instance, 
56 For a detailed study of this relationship in the United States see Poterba (1987). 
57 For example, David and Scadding (1974). -20-
Summers and Carroll (1987) found that corporate repurchases and takeovers may have lowered the US 
private saving rate by 1 to 2 percentage points. 
4.4. Uncertainty and  short-run movements in income 
Most life cycle/permanent income models of  saving are based on the assumption that the present value 
of lifetime wealth is given since it is  assumed that either future income flows are certain or that the 
individual behaves as if the expected value of future income were indeed a certain income (certainty 
equivalence). In reality, uncertainty is one of the major problems the household faces. Uncertainty about 
the time of death which causes the individual to save more and to leave a higher bequest than under 
certainty is only one aspect. There are other, mostly shorter run, aspects of uncertainty which can have 
a major impact on the household's saving strategy, changing the long-run profile of  wealth accumulation 
and the reactions to fluctuations in income. 
Looking  first  at the  individual's  lifetime  saving  profile,  uncertainty  causes  a  typical  risk-averse 
household
58 to save more at young age and less at old age than under certainty equivalence (Caballero, 
1990). The household derives a higher disutility from the risk of having to decrease future consumption 
in  response to a lower-than-expected income than the utility associated with the (same) probability of 
being able to increase future consumption in response to a corresponding lower-than-expected income. 
To diminish the potential impact of such a low income on future consumption, the household is willing to 
forego some of its current consumtion (which it would not do if  future income were certain). If income is 
realized as expected, the household will stick to its original saving plan, which will allow it after a lower 
consumption level in earlier periods to consume more in later periods than under certainty equivalence. 
Otherwise,  the household can  readjust  its savings strategy every time when  income (or necessary 
consumption) is different from what it had been previously expected. Overall, this "prudent" behavior of 
a typical household faced with income uncertainty is one explanation why very young households do have 
positive saving ratios despite their high expected income and consequently helps also to explain a positive 
aggregate household saving rate in a growing population. 
A consequence of  this relation between uncertainty and the household's intertemporal choice is that an 
increase in uncertainty will induce a prudent household to accumulate more wealth, whereas a decrease 
will lower his saving rate. For example, it is likely that such forces were at work during the 1970's when 
the world economy was hit by major up- and downswings following expansive economic policies and the 
58 Assuming a time-separable utility function with non-increasing absolute risk aversion. -21-
two oil crises. The households perceived the higher possibility of being unemployed or suffering a cut in 
real income through high inflation and may have tried to form a buffer against possible income losses. 
As the 1980's brought a long expansion which was only recently interrupted by recessions in the Anglo-
Saxon  countries,  the  perceived  income  risk  declined  and  consequently  the  perceived  need  for 
precautionary savings did too. This may be one important explanation for the decline in household saving 
during the greater part of the 1980's (and the recent pickup). As pointed out earlier, the movement in 
inflation rates coincided with the change in uncertainty and may therefore mistakenly have been identified 
as a factor with a positive impact on household saving (besides the real wealth effect). Other longer-run 
factors that may have contributed to a decline in uncertainty are the expansion of the social security net, 
which has made the loss of income through unemployment less dramatic, and the evolution of various 
insurance schemes. Finally, it is also conceivable that the entrance of  women into working life which can 
be seen from Table 8 may have dampened the households' perceived uncertainty.
59 
Uncertainty may also help to shed some light onto observed responses to short-run income changes. 
For example, the life cycle/permanent income theories predict that the household's consumption pattern 
will be smooth at the moment of a sudden and  previously announced increase in  income; i.e., the 
household's savings rate would increase in response to such a change but consumption would not since 
the increase in consumption is predicted to take place at the moment of  the announcement. However, as 
shown by Flavin (1981) and Wilcox (1989), consumers do react quite strongly to announced increases 
in current income with increases in  consumption ("excess sensitivity of consumption").  Furthermore, 
consumers respond less to unannounced changes in labor income than under the certainty equivalence 
("excess smoothness of  consumption"). Caballero (  1990) has shown that if  specific assumptions are made 
about the form of  the utility function, uncertainty and prudent behavior can explain both these interrelated 
phenomena. In the longer run saving is not affected by these phenomena. 
4.5. Liquidity constraints 
Another possible explanation for  the excess smoothness and sensitivity of  consumption as well as positive 
overall  savings  is  the presence of liquidity constraints.  The typical  model of the consumer's  utility 
maximization subject to a lifetime budget constraint is based on the assumption that capital markets are 
perfect. This implies that a household cannot only borrow against currently held assets such as housing 
!19  Whether or not this effect induces a decrease in saving depends on whether it  offsets effects such as the generally observed 
increasing propensity to save at  a higher income or  a possible motive for  joining the labor  force which may have been to earn income 
for  a housing purchase. It  may be strenghened by higher purchases of  durable goods or  services, e.g. in connection with child care. 
Graham (1987) found evidence that increased labor force partidpation of women lowers the saving rate. -22-
or stocks, but that it is also able to borrow against expected future lifetime income. This leads to the model 
prediction that a household with no current assets and a low current income but with high expected future 
labor income will be a net borrower in early years. In reality, however, capital markets are far from perfect 
and there are borrowing constraints that prevent the household from borrowing as much as would be 
optimal.  As a  result,  current wealth  plays  a  much  more  important  role  for the young  household's 
consumption level than would be implied by the standard models without a liquidity constraint. Evidence 
for such an effect for a considerable number of households has generally been found by Zeldes (  1989), 
Koskela and Virlm (1984), and Ogawa (1990). 
Whereas borrowing constraints may have played an important role in the past by preventing very young 
households from  being  net  borrowers  and  inducing  them  consequently  to  expand  consumption  in 
response to income increases more than would be warranted without such a constraint, developments 
in financial markets are likely to have led to a decrease in the importance of this factor. New financial 
instruments have been created and constraints have been reduced. An important development in this area 
is the reduction of  the percentage down  payment that is needed for the purchase of  a house. Similarly, car 
makers, e.g.,  have developed their own credit instruments. This, together with the rapid expansion of 
credit card use may have contributed to lowering the credit constraint in recent years. This factor may 
have also dampened household saving  during the last decade. However, it certainly also  had  the 
beneficial effect of  enabling households to choose a consumption and savings path which is closer to their 
optimum and at a lower cost of financial intermediation. ~  23-
5. Conclusion 
Saving remains a complicated and only partly understood issue even after decades of intensive and 
excellent research. A major difficulty is that saving is a forward-looking activity and that it involves the 
households' formation of expectations about future developments in an uncertain future. It is not only 
future income from labor and capital that has to be anticipated or the expected lifetime of  the household 
members. Other important parameters include the population growth, the implied social security benefits, 
and the future taxes. 
The saving rate and especially that of  households in each country is the result of  a multitude of  factors 
ranging from demographic characteristics to those influencing individual households in different  ways. The 
simple life cycle model is useful for explaining the long-run impact of changes in the population structure 
on the saving propensity of the household sector as a whole. In the past, the population has aged in 
industrial countries and this has, taken separately, dampened saving behavior. As this aging process 
continues, saving ofthe overall household sector can be expected to be depressed further. The individual 
household is influenced by expectations about future income, including retirement benefits and corporate 
profits, and their uncertainty, as well as by inflation, taxation, and incentive schemes which change the 
expected flow of income and therefore affect his saving decisions. This paper discussed some of these 
channels that affect a household's saving behavior and may have been relevant for the determination of 
the overall housing rates observed. It should be clear from the above discussion that it would be wrong 
to jump to the conclusion that households in a particular country or period are relatively impatient or less 
thrifty just because their observed overall saving rate is relatively low. Tables and Graphs -25-
Table 1  National saving ratios (1) 
1960-69  USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy 
Gross  19.7  34.8  27.3  25.6  28.3 
Net  10.7  25.5  19.8  18.0  19.9 
1970-79  USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy 
Gross  19.6  35.6  24.4  25.9  26.0 
Net  9.2  25.6  15.2  17.1  16.3 
1980-89  USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy 
Gross  16.2  32.4  22.9  20.3  21.6 
Net  3.8  21.6  12.0  8.9  10.8 
(  1) As percent of GOP and NDP, respectively 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
Table 2  Old age dependency ratios (1) 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy 
1960  15.5  9.5  16.0  18.8  13.3 
1965  15.8  9.2  18.3  19.4  14.7 
1970  15.8  10.2  20.7  20.7  15.8 
1975  16.3  11.6  22.6  21.5  17.6 
1980  17.1  13.4  23.4  21.9  19.3 
1985  18.0  15.0  21.2  19.7  18.6 
1989  18.9  16.6  22.0  21.1  21.4 
2005(2)  18.0  26.0  29.0  24.0  25.0 
2025(2)  29.0  32.0  37.0  33.0  32.0 
(1) Population aged 65 and over, divided by population aged between 15 and 64. 
(2) OECD projections. 
Source:  OECD, Labour force statistics, EUROSTAT 
IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1991. 
UK  Canada 
18.8  21.9 
11.3  11.5 
UK  Canada 
18.8  22.6 
9.2  13.0 
UK  Canada 
16.6  20.2 
5.6  9.6 
UK  Canada 
17.9  12.9 
18.9  13.0 
20.7  12.9 
22.4  13.1 
23.3  14.1 
23.0  15.3 
23.9  16.7 
22.0  19.0 
28.0  34.0 -26-
Table 3  Young age dependency ratios(1) 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy 
1960  52.0  47.1  31.5  42.5  34.6 
1965  50.8  37.8  34.5  41.1  34.4 
1970  45.6  34.7  36.4  39.9  34.5 
1975  39.1  35.8  33.5  38.2  34.6 
1980  34.0  35.0  27.4  35.1  30.7 
---
1985  32.7  31.7  21.6  32.2  25.3 
1989  32.9  27.4  21.5  30.4  22.1 
2005(2)  29.0  28.0  22.0  28.0  25 0 
2025(2)  30.0  27.0  23.0  28.0  24.0 
( 1) Population aged 65 and over, divided by population aged between 15 and 64. 
(2) OECD projections. 
Source:  OECDr labour force statistics, EUROSTAT 
IMF, World Economic Outlook. May 1991. 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1989 
Source: 
USA  Japan 
5.0  3.8 
5.2  4.7 
7.5  4.6 
11.1  7.7 
10.9  10.1 
11.0  11.0 
10.3  11.1 
Table 4  Social security transfers 
(as percentage of GOP) 
Germany  France 
12.0  13.5 
12.4  16.4 
12.7  14.8 
17.6  17.4 
16.5  19.2 
16.2  22.1 
15.6  21.4 
OECD, Historical statistics. 
Italy 
9.8 
12.5 
12.4 
15.6 
14.1 
17.1 
17.7 
UK  Canada 
35.8  57.5 
36.3  56.6 
38.3  49.1 
37.3  40.7 
32.8  34.0 
29.3  31.8 
28.9  31.0 
31.0  21.0 
31.0  28.0 
--
UK  Canada 
6.8  7.9 
7.5  6.0 
8.7  7.9 
10.2  10.0 
11.7  9.9 
14.0  12.2 
11.9  11.8 -27-
Table 5  Old age participation ratios (  1) 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy  UK 
1965  16.9  36.8  14.1  17.8  10.7  13.0 
1970  16.0  31.7  11.1  12.8  7.1  11.6 
1975  13.1  27.9  6.9  9.0  5.7  10.0 
1980  11.9  26.3  4.5  4.9  7.5  6.2 
1985  10.2  24.3  3.3  3.4  4.8  5.0 
1989  10.9  23.8  2.7  2.4  4.3  5.7 
(1) Working population aged 65 and over, divided by total population aged 65 and over. 
Source:  OECD, Labour force statistics, EUROSTAT 
A.  Dir. tax 
1970-79 
1980-89 
B.  lndir. tax 
1970-79 
1980-89 
C. (A)/(B) 
1970-79 
1980-89 
Source: 
Table 6  Taxes as percent of GNP 
USA  Japan  Germany 
13.3  9.3  12.3 
13.3  12.8  12.2 
USA  Japan  Germany 
8.4  6.9  13.0 
7.7  7.8  12.6 
USA  Japan  Germany 
1.6  1.3  0.9 
1.7  1.6  1.0 
EC-Commission, internal publication; 
Bank of Canada. 
France 
7.3 
9.0 
France 
14.3 
14.6 
France 
0.5 
0.6 
Italy  UK 
6.5  14.0 
12.6  13.9 
Italy  UK 
9.1  14.1 
9.6  16.2 
Italy  UK 
0.7  1.0 
1.3  0.9 
Canada 
15.5 
12.9 
10.9 
8.9 
7.7 
6.9 
Canada 
14.9 
15.6 
Canada 
13.1 
12.7 
Canada 
1.1 
1.2 -28-
Table 7  Measures to ensure tax collection on capital income: 
Source taxes (in percent) and control messages (R) 
Interest income on savings accounts 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy  UK  Canada 
R  20  - R  30  23.25  R 
_) 
Interest income on bonds 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy  UK  Canada 
R  20  - R  12.5  25  R 
Dividend income 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy  UK  Canada 
R  20  25  R  10  - R 
Source:  Drucksache Nr. 11/2599 des Deutschen Bundestags. 
Table 8  Participation of women (  1) 
USA  Japan  Germany  France  Italy  UK  Canada 
1965  45.7  55.8  48.8  45.7  31.0  50.0  35.3 
1970  50.4  55.4  48.1  49.8  29.1  53.5  41.1 
1975  54.9  51.7  49.7  52.9  29.9  58.6  50.5 
1980  61.3  54.9  50.0  55.6  39.2  61.7  57.9 
1985  65.5  57.2  50.3  56.4  40.6  62.6  63.5 
1989  69.4  59.3  54.7  57.6  44.0  66.0  68.2 
(  1) Share of women at work. 
Source:  OECD, Labour force statistics. 10 -
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Fig. 1 - Net saving in  the G-7 countries 
(as a percentage of national income) 
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Figure 2  - Net household  saving 
{as  a  percentage  of disposable personal income) 
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